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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I explore a Bayesian perspective on avalanche decision-making. I motivate this
general outlook by introducing a well-known cognitive bias, the base-rate fallacy, and show how a similar
pattern applies to decision-making in avalanche-terrain when assessing the relevance of stability tests. I then
present three theoretical lessons that emerge from adopting a Bayesian perspective to avalanche decision-
making. I conclude by raising numerous challenges for avalanche educators when incorporating the Bayesian
perspective into their curriculum and point to future research.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been extensive discus-
sion of the human factor in avalanche decision-
making. Avalanche educators have pointed to vari-
ous well-known biases and heuristic traps that may
lead outdoor enthusiasts to misjudge the risks when
making decisions in avalanche terrain (McCam-
mon, 2004), (Furman et.al., 2010), (Leiter, 2011),
(Marengo et.al, 2017). While much emphasis has
been placed on heuristic traps highlighted in (Mc-
Cammon, 2004), little attention has been paid to a
well-known cognitive bias concerning reasoning and
thinking about probabilities called the base-rate fal-
lacy. When committing this fallacy, intuitive think-
ing involving probabilities is systematically off-target
and leads to serious misjudgements about the risk
of certain events.
The aim here is not to investigate whether back-
country skiers in particular are more or less prone to
this particular fallacy, the article is rather more the-
oretical in nature: highlighting the base-rate fallacy
and its relevance, I ﬁrst motivate a broadly Bayesian
perspective on avalanche decision-making, in par-
ticular in relation to the use of stability tests. In
the subsequent section, I highlight three lessons for
avalanche decision-making that emerge from adopt-
ing the Bayesian perspective. I conclude by high-
lighting various challenges for avalanche educators
when incorporating Bayesian reasoning into their
curriculum.
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2. BAYESIAN REASONING AND THE BASE-RATE
FALLACY
The base rate fallacy became prominent through the
work of (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). It occurs
when a subject does not take so-called base rate in-
formation seriously and reasons in a way that goes
against a theorem of probability called Bayes’ the-
orem. Let us brieﬂy outline one of the classic ex-
amples, inspired by (Eddy, 1982) as discussed in
(Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995) which is referred
to as the Mammography problem:
The probability of breast cancer is 1% for
a woman at age forty who participates in
routine screening. If a woman has breast
cancer, the probability is 80% that she will
get a positive mammography (hit rate). If
a woman does not have breast cancer,
the probability is 9.6% (false positive) that
she will also get a positive mammography.
A woman in this age group had a posi-
tive mammography in a routine screening.
What is the probability that she actually
has breast cancer?
According to (Eddy, 1982)’s informal sample, 95
out of 100 physicians misinterpreted the statement
about the accuracy and estimated the probability of
breast cancer, given a positive diagnostic test, to be
somewhere between 70%-80%. Since then many
more formal studies have been conducted using dif-
ferent contexts and the results are broadly speaking
similar (for variations, however, see (Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage, 1995)). The correct answer in the above
case is roughly 8% and usually lower than intuitive
estimates.
This form of Bayesian reasoning can, however,
be made relevant in an avalanche decision-making
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context, provided we can identify the base rate for
an avalanche event and the relevant hit and false-
positive rate of slope stability tests. For simplicity,
let’s say that a slope is not-safe if and only if a skier
will trigger a decent sized avalanche on that slope.
The required base rate, therefore, will be the proba-
bility that a slope is not-safe prior to having applied
slope speciﬁc diagnostic tests. This type of data is
difﬁcult to acquire without knowing more about the
number of people engaged in the activity, the time
spent in avalanche terrain, and the competencies
of the skiers involved (Techel et.al., 2015), (Winkler
et.al., 2016).
However, enough relevant information is available
to get a ballpark ﬁgure. According to (Winkler
et.al., 2016) the fatality rate is around 1:100,000
for skitouring in Switzerland. Using a fatality rate
of (very) roughly 1 in 10 people who are caught in
an avalanche of decent size (Brugger et.al., 2007)
we arrive at a rate of triggering an avalanche of
around 1:10,000 (0.01%) per day per skier in that
area. Given various “unkowns” in this estimate, let’s
be safe and use a much higher rate of 1 in 100 (1%)
chance that on a given run an avalanche will be trig-
gered prior to applying any stability test. I come
back to variations of the base rate in section 4.
In order to apply Bayesian reasoning, we also re-
quire information about the accuracy of diagnostic
tests for slope stability: in particular, we require
the “hit-rate” and the “false-positive rate”. Again,
it is very difﬁcult to acquire reliable data and most
tests currently in use are subject to much interpre-
tation and errors can be due to human fallibility or
non-representative sampling (Hendrikx et.al., 2008).
Studies suggest so-called “false stable” rates of 6%-
44%, which translates to a hit rate of 56% to 94%,
and false-positive rates between 0%-18% (Simen-
hois and Birkeland, 2009). Let’s again simplify and
use a 80% hit rate and a 10% false-positive rate.
Using these ballpark ﬁgures, we can now put
together a similar template, which we label the
Avalanche Problem:
The probability of a skier triggering a de-
cent sized avalanche on any given skiable
slope in the area is 1%. If a slope is not-
safe, a stability test will have a 80% of indi-
cating that it is not-safe (hit rate). If a slope
is safe, the probability that the stability test
indicates it is not-safe is 10% (false posi-
tive). A stability test is applied to a skiable
slope with the result indicating that it is not-
safe. What is the probability that the slope
is not-safe?
Just as in the Mammography Problem, the proba-
bility that a slope is not-safe, provided the test in-
dicates it is not-safe, is 8%. As a result, in only
1 in 13 cases when the stability test indicates that a
slope is not-safe, will a skier trigger an avalanche on
such a slope, given, of course, the above guessti-
mates for base rate and accuracy of test. In what
follows, we will discuss how this thought experiment,
which exempliﬁes Bayesian reasoning, is of value to
avalanche decision-makers.
3. THREE LESSONS OF BAYESIANISM
To repeat, my intention here is not to explicitly test
whether those navigating through avalanche ter-
rain are more or less susceptible to this kind of
base rate neglect. Rather, the above considera-
tions are used to motivate a Bayesian approach to
avalanche decision-making. In what follows, I out-
line three general lessons that emerge from adopt-
ing a Bayesian perspective.
One natural way to incorporate the Bayesian ap-
proach to avalanche decision-making is to regard
the general avalanche guidance issued by local au-
thorities as an indication of the relevant base rate.
Avalanche forecast authorities worldwide provide
guidance using a standardized ﬁve point scale: level
1. is described as low risk; level 2. is moderate risk;
level 3. amounts to a considerable risk; level 4 con-
stitutes a high risk; level 5. stands for extreme risk.
Recent research conﬁrms that such general guid-
ance does indeed track the underlying risk of trig-
gering an avalanche (Techel et.al., 2015). The pro-
portionality between guidance and risk increase is
hard to quantify: a one level increase in the general
avalanche guidance increases the risk of triggering
an avalanche by a factor somewhere between 2-10.
(Pfeifer, 2009), (Munter, 2003), (Techel et.al., 2015),
(Jamieson et.al., 2009).
If, for the moment, we assume that an assessment
level of considerable reﬂects the above used base
rate of 1 in 100 and we adopt a factor of 4 for an
increase or decrease of one level of the general
avalanche warning, then an avalanche warning of
high would correspond to 1 in 25, while a moder-
ate danger amounts to 1 in 400 chance of triggering
a decent sized avalanche prior to applying any sta-
bility tests. With these base rates in place, we can
highlight an important aspect of how variations in
base rate information may change the “meaning” of
our stability tests.
Consider a moderate warning scenario where the
base rate is 1 in 400. A lower base rate lowers the
probability of a slope being not-safe, given a sta-
bility test result that indicates that it is not-safe, to
less than 2%. So, if the base rate is very low–as
can be assumed on moderate avalanche warning
days–the test’s so-called positive predictive value,
or more simply, its informativeness, is low and only
1 in 50 slopes that are tested not-safe, will indeed
be not-safe! Crucially, the converse is true as well:
in higher avalanche danger, e.g. if the base rate is
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4% (i.e. 1 in 25), then the probability that a slope
is not-safe given that the diagnostic test predicts it
is not-safe is 20%, i.e. 1 in 5 slopes that test not-
safe are indeed not-safe. So, in higher avalanche
danger, the predictive value or the informativeness
of the test–is substantially higher and stability tests
are more likely to be correctly predicting a slope’s
instability.
This consideration constitutes the ﬁrst important
lessons of the Bayesian approach to avalanche
decision-making:
Lesson 1: the role of base rates
Localised diagnostic tests will be more informa-
tive the higher the general avalanche warning.
The ﬂipside is that diagnostic tests become less in-
formative in moderate and low avalanche terrain.
Yet, again we think this insight is important and
contains another important lesson for avalanche
decision-makers with regards to feedback and up-
dating which is generally under-appreciated. To
highlight the issue consider the following scenario:
Imagine a competent decision-maker, call
her Christelle, skiing during moderate
avalanche danger. Assume, she is sub-
ject to the above base rate neglect. Having
taken an avalanche course she thinks that
the diagnostic tests are not merely fairly
reliable but also that they are highly infor-
mative (i.e. she thinks that the probabil-
ity that a slope is not-safe given the test
predicts it is not-safe, is very high). More-
over, imagine that Christelle is a respon-
sible decision-maker and adheres to the
result of her tests and so never skis the
relevant terrain that tests not-safe. Un-
fortunately, however, and as many skiers
will have experienced, she skis in an area
that is home to numerous much more
risk-seeking skiers. The likely feedback
that Christelle will receive on moderate
avalanche danger days is that most often,
“reckless” skiers who ski a slope that pre-
viously tested not-safe actually turns out to
be safe. Thus the feedback she receives
seems to undermine her test results. A
very natural response to that sort of feed-
back would be for Christelle to question
the value of her diagnostic test and treat
it as inaccurate, unreliable, or simply not
ﬁt for purpose. Coupled with the assump-
tion that Christelle is unaware of our ﬁrst
lesson, such a response may be disas-
trous and could, in high avalanche dan-
ger, make it very likely for her to trigger an
avalanche.
What this consideration highlights is that an under-
standing of how diagnostic tests work, the base
rate neglect, and more broadly the Bayesian way
of thinking, will offer educators the tools to fore-
warn students not to draw the wrong “lessons” from
“wrong” tests. Hence:
Lesson 2: the problem of misleading feedback
Avalanche terrain is a “wicked” learning envi-
ronment and does not reliably behave as pre-
dicted (in particular if the stability test predicts
not-safe). Hence, do not “blame” the stability
tests for false positive results: they are to be
expected when the avalanche danger is low. In
fact, their existence is a consequence of the ba-
sic fact that low-probability events are difﬁcult to
detect reliably.
Lastly, it is important not only to look at scenarios
when a test returns a not-safe verdict but also when
they return a safe verdict. This will help to empha-
sise the role of diagnostic test as a method for risk
reduction, and not as a method to settle with any
high degree of conﬁdence the status of a slope. Re-
member that, in a moderate environment given our
assumptions, a non-safe test means that a slope
only has a 2% chance of being not-safe (i.e. 98%
chance of being safe). A 1 in 50 chance of trigger-
ing an avalanche of decent size is, however, very
risky. Yet, if we think of tests more generally as risk
reduction tools, we need to put the 1 in 50 chance
into a wider context: after all, what if a different slope
actually does test safe? Assuming for simplicity, the
same base rate and the same hit/false-positive rate
as above, the probability that a slope is safe, given
the test predicts it is safe, is 99.97% (3 in 1000)
which is much less when compared to 98% (20 in
1000). Hence we arrive at our last insight which is
line with with (Munter, 2003) idea of risk-reduction.
Lesson 3: the method of risk reduction
In avalanche decision making, there is no cer-
tainty, all we can do is to apply tests to reduce
the risk of a bad outcome, yet there will always
be a residual risk.
4. DISCUSSION
Numerous challenges to this approach are dis-
cussed in detail in Ebert (2018). Here it is worth-
while highlighting that the Bayesian approach re-
mains relevant even if the adopted base rate is
much lower (and so more in line with (Winkler et.al.,
2016)), or if the accuracy of the test is much im-
proved. In (Figure 1, Table 1), we look at the effects
of raising the hit rate to 95% and lower the false-
positive rate to 5% which is better than most tests
available today Simenhois and Birkeland (2009).
Considering the three lessons above in the context
of these results, we can see that the ﬁrst lesson is
still supported: the higher the avalanche rating the
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greater the informativeness of the test. Moreover,
we can see that an increase in the accuracy of the
test, results in an increase of informativeness (all
else equal).
Figure 1: The effects of increasing accuracy of tests on the pos-
terior risk. Purple line represents lower accuracy (80% hit rate;
10% false positive), while green line represents higher accuracy
(95% hit rate; 5% false positive). Grey area represents variability
of posterior given variation in accuracy and base rate.
Avalanche rating [80-10 accuracy] [95-5 accuracy]]
Low; 1/1600 (0.063%) ∼5/1000 (0.5%) ∼12/1000 (1.2%)
Moderate; 1/400 (0.25%) ∼2/100 (1.9%) ∼5/100 (4.5%)
Considerable; 1/100 (1%) ∼7/100 (7.5%) ∼16/100 (16.1%)
High; 1/25 (4%) 25/100 (25.0%) ∼44/100 (44.2%)
Extreme 1/6 (16%) ∼62/100 (61.5%) ∼79/100 (79.2%)
Table 1: The effect of increasing accuracy of tests on the poste-
rior risks: the left column contains the base rate. The other two
columns present the probability of an avalanche after a not-safe
test result. Middle columns use a lower accuracy (80% hit rate;
10% false positive rate) while the right-hand column shows the
results using a more accurate test (95% hit rate; 5% false posi-
tive rate).
The second lesson contains a warning about feed-
back and highlights that given a low base rate, it will
be more likely than not that a slope is safe, even
if the test results indicate that the slop is not-safe.
Again, this observation is borne out even with a
more accurate test. On a moderate and consider-
able rating using the more accurate test, the proba-
bility that a slope is not-safe given a not-safe test is
roughly 4.5% and 16.1% respectively (compared to
1.9% and 4.5% respectively, using the less accurate
test). Hence, there is still a danger to misinterpret
the most likely outcome (i.e. no avalanche) as evi-
dence that the test is unreliable, which is what les-
son two warns against. Note that, if, as alluded to
above, the base rate is in fact much lower, then the
problem of misleading feedback will be even more
pronounced.
Lesson three also remains intact and the variation of
the accuracy of the test nicely highlights how effec-
tive avalanche training can help to reduce the risk–
especially if we assume that the better trained the in-
dividual, the more accurate her stability tests. Only if
our test is maximally accurate will there be no resid-
ual risk–a scenario which is extremely (to say the
least) unlikely.
5. BAYESIAN REASONING AND AVALANCHE
EDUCATION
The theoretical exercise of using Bayesian reason-
ing contains a number of lessons about how to
reason properly with evidence provided by stability
tests that are not widely acknowledged in avalanche
education–the exception being the more technical
discussion in (McClung, 2011). Given that Bayesian
reasoning is one of the best tools we have to rea-
son with uncertainties and probabilities, and given
that avalanche decision-making is in effect decision-
making under uncertainty with high stakes, it seems
prudent to take Bayesian perspective seriously in
this context.
Nonetheless, the considerations also contain a
huge challenge to avalanche educators: Bayesian
reasoning is not always very intuitive (hence the
fallacy alluded to above) and it is easily misunder-
stood. So even if the three lessons presented are
correct, we also have to face the more practical or
rather pedagogical question whether they should be
part of an avalanche education curriculum? I will
highlight some challenges for avalanche educators
willing to take the Bayesian perspective seriously.
There is a genuine danger that some students will
draw the wrong consequences from lesson one and
two when the avalanche danger is low or moder-
ate: they might consider stability tests as irrelevant
in that context. So they might think that a test in-
dicating a not-safe slope is not informative enough
and so they might be tempted to ignore the test re-
sults.
This kind of thinking will have to be countered ef-
fectively and to do so educators will likely need
to present the lessons in the wider context of ap-
proaching avalanche education as an efﬁcient way
to reduce the risk more generally. As alluded
to above, while a 2% probability of triggering an
avalanche (i.e. skiing a slope that tested not-safe
on a moderate day) might not seem high (to some
skiers), it will likely seem unacceptable if that risk
can easily be reduced to 0.3% by skiing a different
slope. To strengthen this observation, educator may
also want to highlight the cumulative aspect of risk:
taking higher risks on a regular basis will make it
much more likely in the long run to get caught in
an avalanche than always choosing the lower risk
(Ebert and Photopoulou , 2013).
Alternatively, to further foreclose the above misinter-
pretation, educators ought to remind their students
not to rely too heavily on speciﬁc numbers: there is
a great variability in the data due to personal, geo-
graphic and other factors. Importantly, the greater
the variability of the risk, the lower the relevance of
the mean average–used in most data above–when
considering an individual’s risks. Nonetheless, while
we need to be very careful when applying the above
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risk statements to a speciﬁc case, there is value in
considering the above scenarios as a theoretical ex-
ercise since the three lessons of the Bayesian ap-
proach will not be affected by this variability. Addi-
tionally, in the context of regarding stability tests as
tools for risk reduction, it will be important for ed-
ucators to highlight that different kinds of tests at
different locations will help to increase the hit rate
(though may increase the false-positive rate) and so
can help to further reduce the chances of triggering
an avalanche. Further research of how best to ag-
gregate judgements, i.e. combine the results from
a number of different stability tests or from different
subjects, is planned.
Lastly, educators may decide to introduce the
Bayesian perspective and its three lessons in more
advanced avalanche education courses only. These
courses are usually taken by aspiring avalanche
forecasters or mountain guides. Given that most
introductory courses to avalanche decision-making
focus more on avalanche awareness rather than the
use of various stability tests, Bayesian reasoning will
become much more relevant at a more advanced
level of avalanche decision-making. When doing so,
it will be prudent to take note of (Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage, 1995) who showed how different informa-
tion formats and presentations of the problem can
help to induce better Bayesian reasoning even with-
out detailed training.
Ultimately, avalanche educators have to decide
whether the theoretical beneﬁts of the Bayesian
approach outweigh the potential disadvantages of
misinterpreting them. Given Eddy’s (Eddy, 1982)
call to train medical experts of the potential pit-
falls of ignoring base-rate information so to avoid
“major errors” when advising their patients, maybe
mountain guides and advanced avalanche decision-
makers could beneﬁt from learning more about sim-
ilar pitfalls that can affect their decision-making in
avalanche terrain.
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